

U.S. SHIFT ON CUBA IN 1960 DETAILED

Book by Ex-Envoy Says
Moves Sought Castro Fall

By HENRY RAYMONT

Philip W. Bonsal, the last United States Ambassador to Cuba, says in a new book that the Eisenhower Administration's economic sanctions against the Cuban Government of Premier Fidel Castro in the summer of 1960 were imposed without the prior knowledge of the State Department or the United States Embassy in Havana.

The sanctions, he says, were enacted to complement covert military training of Cuban exiles designed to achieve the fall of Premier Castro, although professional diplomats were counseling a policy of restraint and nonintervention in the hope that some form of negotiated settlement was still possible.

The story of the shift in United States policy 18 months after Mr. Castro seized power is recounted by the former envoy in a book titled "Cuba, Castro and the United States," just published by the University of Pittsburgh Press. Mr. Bonsal, who was appointed Ambassador to Cuba in January, 1959, was recalled to Washington on Oct. 28, 1960, some two months before President Eisenhower severed diplomatic relations with the Castro Government. He retired from the Foreign Service in 1965, after having served as Ambassador to Morocco.

In the book, which portrays Premier Castro as an impulsive, power-thirsty autocrat, Mr. Bonsal attributes the harsher attitude toward Cuba to the pressure of private American oil and sugar interests and to "various highly placed people in different agencies who took decisions and set in motion activities related to Cuba" without informing the State Department.

Bonsal Identifies Agencies

Mr. Bonsal, a man of long experience in hemisphere affairs, identified the "different agencies" in an interview from his home in Washington as Vice President Richard M. Nixon's office, the Central Intelligence

Agency and the Treasury Department.

He also repeated the thesis of his book—that the new policy played into the hands of Premier Castro's plans to nationalize American properties by giving him the excuse of "economic aggression," while speeding his march into the Soviet camp. Although he did not think that a continuation of the policy of restraint would have changed Premier Castro's ultimate course, Mr. Bonsal believed it would probably have delayed it, creating greater internal difficulties.

"In June and July, 1960," he writes, "the United States confronted Castro with situations in the economic field designed to accelerate his downfall. The American measures included the pressing advice given companies having a virtual monopoly of oil refining in Cuba to refuse to handle the crude petroleum the Cuban Government was acquiring from the Soviet Union and the refusal to allow the importation into the United States of the sugar unshipped from Cuba under the American quota in effect for 1960.

"Also during the spring and summer of 1960 there was a concerted removal of key Cuban and American personnel from American companies in Cuba; this was supposed to hamper the functioning of important units of the island economy. This operation was coordinated—to the extent that it was—from New York. These measures were to be complemented, as necessary, to achieve the fall of Castro by United States-directed and subsidized covert operations by United States-selected Cuban opponents of the regime."

Mr. Bonsal relates how on June 4, 1960, he heard from the chief executive of an American oil company in Cuba that Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson had advised the company to refine crude Soviet petroleum acquired by Cuba.

Receives Startling News

Stating that up to that point the State Department had agreed with the companies that they would process the Soviet oil under protest while arguing their case before Cuban courts, Mr. Bonsal proceeds:

"To say that I was startled at the news of Mr. Anderson's decision and at the channel through which it was conveyed to me would be putting it mildly."

A similar surprise was in store for the envoy when a month later President Eisenhower announced the suspen-

sion of Cuba's sugar quota.

"Some writers have regarded this action as in the nature of a reprisal for the intervention of the refineries," he says. "I do not believe this was the case. The suspension of the sugar quota was a major element in the program for the overthrow of Castro."

Because he had anticipated that the Administration would have used the discretionary powers obtained from Congress to simply reduce the quota, allowing for its reinstatement through negotiation, Mr. Bonsal sent a telegram to Washington opposing the contemplated action on the ground that it nullified "the benefits reaped from our previous policies of restraint and nonintervention."

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